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As China’s lone treaty ally and unruly neighbour, North Korea is closelywatched by Chinese officials and scholars for developments thatmay impact Sino-North Korean relations, the Korean Peninsula, and
even the Northeast Asia region. While North Korea’s nuclear program has
attracted the world’s attention since the first crisis erupted in 1994, Chinese
academics remain attentive to the progress of economic reform in the
North. Taking the long view, Chinese scholars are generally optimistic about
the prospects for continued North Korean economic reform under
favourable international conditions.
28 years of economic reform and counting
Over the last three decades, North Korea has initiated a series of largely
unsuccessful economic reforms, but has recently renewed Chinese hopes
with a series of new initiatives since January 2010. According to Zhu Liaoye
and Xu Yonggen, the history of economic reform in the North can be traced
back as far as 1984 with the introduction of the Joint Venture Law (heying
fa 合营法) in an early attempt to attract foreign investment. (7) This was fol-
lowed by the creation of two Free Economic Trade Zones in 1991, which
failed to attract significant investment. (8) Most scholars trace the recent arc
of reforms to 1 July 2002 (“7.1 jingji gaige” 7.1 经济改革 or “7.1 cuoshi”
7.1措施), when Kim Jong-il’s government enacted a more liberalised eco-
nomic policy that allowed a certain degree of private markets and more in-
dependent operation of farms and businesses, while raising wages and
adjusting prices.
The December 2009 currency reform was officially intended to stop in-
flation and eliminate illegal black markets. (9) The reform allowed North Ko-
rean citizens seven days to convert their old currency to the new currency
at variable rates and in limited quantities. (10) The 2009 currency reform
caused unrest and forced the government to relax its strict limits, and to
eventually offer subsidies as compensation. While most scholars view the
reform as an unsuccessful attempt to stop inflation and eliminate inequality
and corruption, Cui Yan sees it as an attempt by the state to reassert control
over the economy. Cui Yan asserts that the reform most importantly was
intended to “reclaim the personal capital that was circulating in the markets
and to monitor the markets in order to once again bring the entire national
economy back under the supervision of the traditional planned economy.”
The most recent surge of reform is generally dated to January 2010. In
rapid succession, North Korea announced the Strategic 10 Year Plan (2011-
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2020) for National Economic Development, created the Taepung Interna-
tional Investment Group and the National Development Bank, and elevated
the Rason Economic and Trade Zone (luoxian jingji maoyi qu 罗先经济贸易
区) to the new status of “special city” (tebie shi 特别市). This surge coincided
with Kim Jong-il’s – unprecedented – four visits to China between May 2010
and August 2011. These events led to a great discussion in China over the
prospects for reform, its possible path, and the role of the international com-
munity in this process.
Economic reform is the only path to stability and
prosperity
The North will continue to deepen its commitment to economic reform
since it seems to be the only path towards economic prosperity and political
stability. Zhu and Xu assert that economic reform in the North is “histori-
cally inevitable [and that] North Korea is at the point that it won’t survive
without reform,” adding that it is also the trend of socialism. With earnest
reform, the North can become self-sufficient for grain production and join
the international community. Gong Yutao claims that “without economic
reform there is no economic development” in the North, and that the North
will adopt economic reform in order to accomplish the government’s goal
of becoming a strong and prosperous country (qiangsheng daguo 强盛大国,
gangseong daegug in Korean) by 2012, along with the need to maintain po-
litical control and a stable power transition. This also follows Kim Jong-un’s
statement in November 2011 that food is now more important than bullets.
Gong adds that the North has been responsive to the needs of its economy
in the past, including the agricultural reforms since 2002 in response to food
shortages, so the North will embrace reform again. More importantly, Gong
believes that successful economic reform will reduce tensions in the penin-
sula by giving North Korea more confidence in its interactions with the
South through non-military means. Furthermore, reform will pave the way
for unification with improved leverage for the North, since the ultimate goal
of both countries is eventual unification, and the country with the strongest
economy will drive the process.
There are many promising signs that the North intends to pursue the nec-
essary economic reforms. Gong Yutao and Zhang Huizhi highlight North
Korea’s New Year’s editorials in 2010 and 2011 (yuandan shelun 元旦社论)
as evidence for the renewed focus on economic reforms. (11) Gong notes that
North Korea’s increased marketisation after 2002 demonstrates that the
North is making progress towards a Chinese-style “Reform and Opening”
(gaige kaifang 改革开放). Zhang Huizhi views the North’s two Economic
Development Zones with China, Rason and the Hwanggumpyong-Mimwha
Islands zone (huangjinping-weihuadao jingji qu 黄金坪、威化岛经济区), as
a proof that the North is committed to economic reform. (12) She believes
that now that the North has started international economic cooperation
and stepped toward marketisation, the Democratic Popular Republic of
Korea (DPRK) government is unable to stop the steady march of reform.
However, doubts remain over the impetus for reform and the likelihood
of a true breakthrough towards a market economy. Zhang Liangui does not
see any hope for true economic reform in the North and does not see the
previous changes in economic policy as genuine efforts toward reform. He
views the true goal of North Korea’s economic reform as supporting the
military-first policy (xianjun zhengce 先军政策, Songun in Korean) by cre-
ating another revenue stream for the military’s nuclear and missile pro-
grams. The reforms of early 2010 were driven by the North Korean military’s
need for foreign currency, since the sanctions enacted through UN Security
Council Resolution 1874 cut off the traditional sources of money, including
Japanese remittances, South Korean donations, and arms exports. (13) Zhang
Liangui cites the fact that the National Defence Council announced the Jan-
uary 2010 initiatives, not the Cabinet, which officially should run the econ-
omy. He believes Rason is intended to solve the North’s oil shortage by
diversifying oil imports and earning foreign currency through transit fees.
Many elements still impede economic reforms in the
North
Despite these positive prospects, there are many factors that continue to
obstruct the forward progress of reform. Reflecting a common opinion, Zhu
and Xu assert that the failure of North Korea’s past reforms was due to the
superficiality of early reforms and the government’s lack of consistent effort
in implementation. Furthermore, the current reforms are inhibited by the
government’s fear of political instability, lack of public will for reform, lack
of an overall design, and resistance by state-owned enterprises. Piao Yinzhe,
Li Shenghua, and Yan Ying’en cite international sanctions as the biggest fac-
tor limiting the North’s ability to enact far-reaching reforms, followed by
the contradiction between the military-first policy and economic develop-
ment, as well as a lack of public will. Zhang Huizhi also ties the difficulties
affecting the North’s economic reform to international sanctions and the
government’s fear of social instability, challenges to its authority, and prob-
lems for the power transition to Kim Jong-un.
While North Korea may embrace deeper economic reform, the govern-
ment will pursue reform on its own accord. Both Zhang Liangui and Zhang
Huizhi note that the DPRK’s state-run newspapers declared distrust of the
term “reform and opening.” One North Korean article proclaimed: “The peo-
ple of every country in the world who uphold self-determination must
clearly recognise the reactivity and danger of the conspiracy of ‘reform’ and
‘opening’ advocated by the imperialists, and must confront it with a high
level of vigilance.”
The path forward
While future progress on economic reforms will continue to be slow and
cautious, there are opportunities to ensure their success through experi-
mentation and international support. Zhang Huizhi believes reforms outside
the system (‘tizhiwai’ gaige “体制外”改革) are the key to economic reform
in the DPRK. She asserts that this style of reform “is outside of the planned
economic system [and] is a basic force to develop new offices for managing
markets and have them promote market reforms.” The independence from
the system allows the reforms to proceed without presenting the typical
problems of economic liberalisation, namely inflation, inequality, corruption,
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materialism, and illegal markets. Zhang Huizhi believes the new investment
company, national investment bank, and other initiatives are all part of this
new style of reform, and that these reforms will eventually lead to the cre-
ation of a new economic system. In contrast with Zhang Liangui’s scepti-
cism over Rason, Zhang Huizhi believes Rason allows the North Korean
government to experiment with economic reforms without fear of political
instability. Zhu and Xu believe the North Korean leaders will initiate the re-
forms, since the people lack the ability to initiate reforms themselves. They
believe the reforms will start with the agricultural sector, namely agricultural
privatisation, possibly based on China’s household responsibility system
(baochan daohu 包产到户) from the late 1970s.
International support for reforms through increased economic coopera-
tion between China, North Korea, and South Korea will be an important
component to drive reform externally and integrate the North into the in-
ternational economic system. Piao et al. see an opportunity to align China’s
Chang-Ji-Tu project (14) (changjitu kaifa kaifang xiandaoqu 长吉图开发开放
先导区), North Korea’s strong and prosperous nation claim, and South
Korea’s desire to become the economic hub of Northeast Asia. China and
South Korea can guide the reforms by actively promoting reform through
their economic cooperation with the North. Cooperation should first strive
to improve the DPRK economy through focusing on agricultural, energy,
and industrial policies and giving preferential tax rates to North Korean
products sold in China and South Korea. Second, economic cooperation
should focus on promoting reform by making the North end its military-
first policy, designing aid to push reforms and not merely treat existing
problems, as well as China advocating market economics with North Ko-
rean officials.
China’s role and the international environment
China can encourage economic reform through sharing its own experience
as well as continuing to invest and trade with the North. While North
Korea’s road to reform will undoubtedly be unique, Zhu and Xu, among oth-
ers, frequently reference the experience of China and Vietnam for compar-
ison. They suggest that the North can learn from China and Vietnam’s
success as it makes a similar transition towards a market economy. Zhu and
Xu state that “China and Vietnam’s Reform and Opening proves that only
with Reform and Opening is there development, and only with development
can one raise the ruling party’s authority and governing ability as well as
raise the peoples’ quality of life and win the hearts of the people while
strengthening the socialist system.” Zhang Huizhi views China-DPRK eco-
nomic cooperation as a good opportunity for North Korea to deepen reform
by allowing the North to see China’s successful integration of socialism and
capitalism while also demonstrating to the world that the North is serious
about reform. Following China’s experience, although Zhu and Xu, among
others, noted that the transition to a market economy would possibly chal-
lenge the government’s hold on power, they did not link economic reform
to progress on political reforms.
The North’s international environment will dictate the extent to which a
reformed North Korea can thrive in the international community. The North
needs to convince the international community to end sanctions, as those
have an outsized impact on the North’s prospects for economic reform by
isolating the country and depriving it of needed capital. Zhu and Xu assert
that UN sanctions and the United States make other countries fearful of
establishing trade and investment with the North. The United States looms
large over discussions of the prospects for economic reform in the DPRK.
All authors noted the need for improved US-DPRK relations before there
can be genuine reform in the North. Piao et al. believe better relations are
the biggest factor for economic reform, while Zhang Huizhi believes im-
proved ties would allow the North to gain access to loans and aid from the
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and others. Zhu and Xu view US
motives vis-à-vis North Korea with suspicion and claim that the US wants
the North to be a member of the “free world,” namely to be controlled by
South Korea. Similarly, Gong claims that the United States “has never aban-
doned its goal of toppling the current North Korean government.”
While the DPRK government has been hesitant to fully embrace economic
reforms, the leadership will eventually be forced to enact fundamental
changes to its economic system out of necessity for the continued survival
of the country and as the only means to uphold and fulfil promises of eco-
nomic development for the people of North Korea.
72 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 2 / 4
14. The Chang-Ji-Tu project was proposed in 2009 as an economic development plan for the cities of
Changchun, Jilin, and Tumen in Jilin Province.
Current affairs
